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THESIS ABSTRACT 
Peter Brian Ward 
Master of Arts 
Russian, East European, and Eurasian Studies Program 
June 2017 
Title: Can the United States and Russia Cooperate? Analyzing the Results of Bilateral 
and Multilateral Cooperation on the Syrian Conflict 
 
 The discourse regarding US/Russia relations focuses intensely on the 
competitive nature between these two powers. Policy makers echo strategies of the past 
by making recommendations which embrace competitiveness and mutual mistrust as 
unavoidable characteristics for future relations. Although these perspectives are not 
entirely misled, they fall short of illustrating the finer nuances of relations.  This paper 
offers an extensive analysis of three instances of cooperation between the US and 
Russia in Syria between 2011 and 2017 in order to offer concrete observations about 
how these antagonistic powers work together. The analysis shows that although the US 
and Russia are competitive and often have opposing agendas, this does not necessarily 
prevent them from cooperative engagement that produces substantive results. Their 
polarity can even contribute to more effective cooperation. This paper also draws 
conclusions about what circumstances improve the effectiveness of US/Russia 
cooperation and makes recommendations for future mutual efforts in Syria. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 George Kennan, in his essay published under the pseudonym ‘Mr. X’ in 1947, 
famously coined the strategy of containment as the only sensible approach for US policy 
towards the Soviet Union. The essay, titled ‘The Sources of Soviet Conduct,’ described 
the domestic history and characteristics that determined the USSR’s foreign policy, in 
particular, its relations with capitalist countries in the West.  
Kennan outlined how the USSR leadership’s dogmatic socialist/communist 
idealism estranged them from their own population and created the need for a strictly 
ordered dictatorship to preserve and increase their authority. In order to legitimize this 
oppressive dictatorship, according to Kennan, the USSR criticized capitalist countries, 
holding them up as the enemies of righteous communism (856). This dynamic was 
corroborated by the basic belief among the Soviet leadership in the inherent antagonism 
that was supposed to exist between socialist and capitalist countries. In response to this 
understanding of the Soviet mentality, Kennan advised the following: “the main element 
of any United States policy toward the Soviet Union must be that of a long-term, patient 
but firm and vigilant containment of Russian expansive tendencies” (861). He also 
predicted that, “we are going to continue for a long time to find the Russians hard to deal 
with” (859). 
 Kennan’s famous argument enjoyed significant influence in its time and many of 
his assertions have had a recurring relevance throughout the 20th century. Since the fall 
of the Soviet Union and the development of the Russian Federation in its place, relations 
between the Kremlin and western powers have progressed and regressed in stages. 
Today the discourse of inherent east-west antagonism has rekindled. Scholarship and 
the media are focused on the competitive nature of US/Russian relations to the extent 
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that some cynics are saying that the Cold War is on again (Rosefielde, xi). George 
Kennan’s poignant analysis of Soviet conduct is seemingly relevant once again. 
 That an escalation in tensions between the US and Russia has occurred in the 
past several years is undeniable. Since the beginning of Barack Obama’s second term in 
office, relations between the two powers have worsened over some particularly 
important issues. For example, when thousands of opposition protesters took to the 
streets to protest the Duma elections of 2011, Russia blamed the US for meddling in its 
domestic politics (Stent, Power Play, 124). Around the same time, presidential candidate 
Mitt Romney was calling Russia “America’s number one geopolitical foe” (125). This 
antagonism predated Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014 and its military intervention 
in the Syrian conflict the year before, both of which seriously concerned western powers 
and raised questions about Russia’s self-assertion on the world stage.  
 An interdisciplinary wargame conducted by the U.S. Army War College in 2015 
analyzed the “‘Russian system’ and “the forces of stasis and change at work on its 
various components.”  According to the report’s policy conclusions, the United States 
must: 
● Shift from a cooperative to a more competitive approach towards Russia 
● Clearly articulate its position towards Russia, Eastern Europe, and Ukraine 
● Challenge Russia in the competition of ideas and influence 
● Account for the two national election cycles in 2016 and 2018 
        (US Army War College, 
2015) 
 These policy conclusions very much describe widely held views about the 
posture the US must hold regarding Russia today. Views such as this in today’s 
scholarship focus on an inherent antagonism between the US and Russia caused by 
conflicting agendas that cannot be reconciled. The popular narrative is that Russian 
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assertiveness in Crimea and Syria has shattered the West’s idealistic view for the post-
Cold War world order (Rosefielde, 229). Therefore, in the rising struggle between 
conflicting views, only one side will prevail. Despite a very different geopolitical 
environment, this narrative bears significant resemblance to Kennan’s assertions about 
the USSR in 1947. It has an ideological component, albeit not socialist or communist but 
something of a different order. It also recognizes an inherent antagonism between 
opposing sides, which seemingly cannot be negotiated around.  
 Angela Stent, in her book, “The Limits of Partnership,” discusses the complex 
history of Russian/US relations since the collapse of the Soviet Union. She discusses 
the multiple “resets” in relations since Putin came to power (x). Stent’s book aims to 
answer basic questions about US/Russian relations today. In order to do this, it traces 
relations between these powers back to the Cold War. Stent asserts that, although the 
Cold War is over, its influence is still felt in relations between Russia and the United 
States (xi).  
Stent also discusses how Russia’s leadership struggled to revive the economy in 
the 1990s and how it felt slighted by the lack of aid from western countries, who treated 
it like a defeated nation and not like a partner (255). This perception dominated Russia’s 
foreign policy under Yevgeny Primakov in the late ‘90s. When Putin came to power, 
relations became better during a brief window after September 11, 2001, but were once 
again soured by US aggressiveness in the Middle East and other disagreements. Stent 
observes that subsequent resets in relations have always returned to mistrust and 
disagreement (xi). 
Stent also characterizes the debate in the US over how to deal with Russia as 
having two camps. She describes one camp as embracing a Realpolitik perspective 
(257). This view stresses working with Russia where it fits US national interest, while 
asserting US policy as clearly as possible to avoid grey areas. This camp argues: “the 
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relationship is most productive when Washington concentrates on pragmatic foreign 
policy cooperation with Moscow, limits criticism of its domestic system, focuses on the 
resolution of common problems, and treats Russia with respect” (257). Critics of this 
perspective take issue with Russia’s domestic situation and its turn away from 
democracy. They see foreign policy cooperation as being relevant to Russia’s domestic 
politics and assert that the US should penalize Russia for its growing authoritarianism 
(257).  
 Angela Stent also remarks on the relevance of George Kennan’s writings to 
today’s world. She asserts: “The question that George Kennan raised in his 1947 ‘Mr. X’ 
article - To what extent does Russia’s domestic system create a unique foreign policy 
that makes dealing with Moscow unlike dealing with any other power? - remains alive 
today” (257). Stent considers the echoing assertions of Kennan, and finds them to still 
be an important voice when considering how the US should be oriented towards Russia.  
My research seeks to add to the contemporary discourse regarding US/Russian 
relations by examining recent and ongoing examples of their cooperation in the Syrian 
conflict. Both Russia and the US have been involved in the Syrian conflict since it began 
in early 2011. The conflict is currently ongoing, which makes it difficult in some respects 
to draw meaningful conclusions from. However, I believe it provides a necessary 
perspective when considering the trajectory of US/Russian relations in the future.  
The goal of my research and analysis is to see if examples of collusion in Syria 
display adequate evidence of the potential effectiveness of US/Russian multilateral and 
bilateral cooperative efforts. By thoroughly analyzing three case studies, I also hope to 
highlight some of the real factors driving the conflict. The goal of my research is to 
contribute to the global discourse, which aims to determine the nature of relations 
between the US and Russia in the years to come. In my analysis, I acknowledge a 
competitive aspect in these relations but strive to find the core components of conflicting 
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agendas in order to be more precise regarding the competitive/cooperative potential 
between these two powers. 
 
WHY SYRIA? 
 
The Syrian conflict continues today with no end in sight. Such a current issue 
might typically be avoided for academic study because it is unresolved and thus difficult 
to approach with the clarity of hindsight. However, analysis of this conflict is relevant 
today as the world questions the viability of a US/Russian led diplomatic solution.  
The political relationship between the US and Russia since the fall of the Soviet 
Union has gone through several transformations. In the early 1990s, Russia’s foreign 
policy under Yeltsin and Kozyrev was decidedly pro-western. When Vladimir Putin 
entered office in 1999, his Pragmatic Cooperation placed Russia first, viewing 
cooperation with western powers as necessary only so far as they serve Russia’s 
national interests (27). This policy brought Russia into western institutions like the WTO 
and the G8 (28). However, as time progressed, Putin’s policy was sharply distinguished 
from and often in direct conflict with western agendas. Multiple “restarts” in relations 
between the US and Russia have been attempted, such as when the Obama 
administration took office in 2009, but such high hopes have usually fizzled when forced 
to reconcile with strongly conflicting national interests, especially in the realm of 
international security (Stent, Limits, xi). Considering the volatility of US/Russian relations 
since 1990, analyzing recent events is actually the best way to represent relations as 
they stand today. 
Syria today represents a unique case for a lot of reasons. The conflict is highly 
entrenched and touches the domestic politics of many regional and international powers. 
Indeed, one reason the conflict has become so entrenched is the number of state and 
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non-state actors trying to assert their agenda in it. Although many powerful actors agree 
on the need for a diplomatic solution, the US and Russia have asserted conflicting 
agendas since the conflict began in 2011 and have rallied other powers to their 
respective causes. This polarity means that the Syrian conflict is an opportunity for 
diplomatic cooperation between opposing agendas. The three case studies I analyze are 
examples of cooperation between two powerful states and their allies that have occurred 
within four years of one another. There is much to be understood from the highly 
condensed and rich diplomatic history that has transpired over the Syrian conflict from 
2011. It merits observation today and in the future so that effective diplomacy between 
opposing powers can be understood and improved upon. 
 The intensity of the humanitarian crisis surrounding the Syrian conflict creates 
another strong need for analysis. As will be discussed in regards to case study II, the US 
and Russia have the ability to gain humanitarian access to places that are unreachable 
without their respective leverage, where thousands of people live without adequate food, 
medicine, and water. Understanding how these powers can influence parties to the 
conflict to increase access for aid is essential for improving the overall humanitarian 
situation. This problem provides an opportunity for the US and Russia to reconcile their 
opposing agendas and work together. My analysis will describe how that cooperation 
works and under what conditions it thrives. 
 
OVERVIEW OF DIPLOMATIC ACTIVITY IN SYRIA SINCE 2011 
 
 From the outbreak of revolution in 2011, the US and Russia have had sharply 
contrasting views on how and to what end the Syrian conflict should be resolved. 
Powers like the US, EU, France, and Turkey, favor regime change. Russia, China, and 
Iran oppose this action, favoring negotiations for a peace that would not remove al-
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Assad, but allow the people of Syria to decide in elections. The US supports the 
opposition and Russia remains loyal to the Syrian Government.  
The UNSC has unanimously recognized that a diplomatic solution is the only way 
to end the conflict in Syria (Geneva Communique, 2012). However, for a number of 
reasons, negotiations on the UNSC to bring about a diplomatic end to the conflict have 
been underwhelming. This is partially due to the highly political nature of negotiations, 
which can be frozen in action by a single veto from a P5 member. 
The Security Council has managed to pass sporadic resolutions since 2011 
aimed at establishing a ceasefire and observer mission but, as a whole, the body is too 
inflexible to adjust to the ever changing needs of the conflict. When a controversial issue 
comes to the UNSC such as establishing a ceasefire, it has been too slow or entirely 
unable to reach a productive consensus. Nonetheless, it has continuously passed 
resolutions pertaining to UN humanitarian and peace operations in Syria.  Today the 
UNSC is bypassed by other negotiating platforms, such as the International Syrian 
Support Group (ISSG) and the Astana peace process, which are specifically tailored to 
meet the needs of this particular conflict. The UNSC is still an important part of the 
diplomatic process in Syria and its authority can be wielded effectively when the 
membership are in agreement. 
The Geneva Communique, drafted in June of 2012, is the foundation for the 
diplomatic process for peace in Syria. It was issued after multilateral talks took place in 
Geneva, which included a host of countries from both sides of the political playing field. 
The talks yielded a road map for a diplomatic resolution to the conflict that all parties, 
including the Syrian Government, agreed to. The Geneva Communique stipulates a 
specific plan to end the conflict, which includes a detailed outline of the transitional 
governing body and the role the regime and opposition forces should play in it.  
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The UNSC unanimously urged the Syrian government to cooperate with the 
peace plan set forth in 2012 (UNSC resolution 2042). The Syrian Government has 
formally agreed to the terms set in the Geneva Communique but its compliance with 
those terms is extremely unreliable. The UN has even observed direct and overt 
violations of ceasefires and provisions guaranteeing humanitarian access, which have 
created the impression that the Government means to sabotage the peace process 
(UNSC resolution 2139). It seems that the Syrian Government condones an unregulated 
approach to waging this war because it considers the opposition to be saboteurs and 
terrorists, which al-Assad promised to “crush with an iron fist” in a public address in 2012 
(BBC, 2015). The goal of the Syrian Government, al-Assad especially, is self-
preservation. If this seems threatened in any way by the diplomatic process, their 
compliance is questionable. As the fate of the current regime in Syria is highly insecure, 
their compliance has been a major obstacle in the way of a diplomatic peace.  
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CHAPTER II 
CASE STUDIES 
 
The following three case studies are close looks at cooperative efforts between 
the US and Russia to increase the compliance and accountability of both the Syrian 
Government and the opposition. They illustrate how these two major foreign influences 
with differing agendas are helping to implement the terms of the Geneva Communique 
and actualize a peace process. 
My analysis assumes that state actors who agree with the steps outlined in the 
Geneva Communique of 2012 genuinely prefer a diplomatic peace to a military peace. A 
lot has changed in Syria since this plan was agreed upon in 2012. Actions such as 
Russia’s military intervention in support of al-Assad suggest that it only supports 
diplomatic efforts on paper. It is not the goal of this essay to outline the ever-changing 
roles of foreign militaries in Syria or what their actions mean about the national interest 
of foreign actors. The sheer presence of foreign military resources on either side is not 
enough evidence to prove that a diplomatic peace is not the primary goal. At the same 
time, as my research shows, both the US and Russia have whole heartedly participated 
in the diplomatic process, often when its costs outweigh its benefits. Only time can tell if 
making this assumption is wise but, for the purpose of my analysis, it provides a 
mechanism by which I can trace common goals between opposing agendas. 
 
I. Chemical Weapons Bilateral Framework 
 
 According to a 2016 report by the Syrian American Medical Society (SAMS), 
chemical weapons attacks have claimed the lives of 1491 victims since the outset of the 
Syrian civil war in 2011. The report claims 14,581 injured and a striking number of 
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attacks using chlorine gas, an agent that goes unregulated by the Chemical Weapons 
Convention (CWC).  
In 2013, The Obama administration threatened punitive military strikes if Bashar 
al-Assad did not give up Syria’s chemical weapons stockpiles. After the August 2013 
attacks in Ghouta, Syria in which reportedly more than 1000 people perished in a single 
attack using sarin gas, the Obama Administration threatened punitive airstrikes against 
the Syrian government forces if it did not turn over its chemical weapons and allow for 
full accounting to be done (Shaheen, The Guardian, 2016).  
Shortly after this declaration, Syria agreed to join the CWC and reported 1300 
metric tons of chemical weapons agents to be destroyed (Nikitin, Progress). The United 
States and Russia created a bilateral framework for facilitating the disarmament, which 
was carried out under very unique circumstances by a multilateral effort throughout 
2014. The Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), working 
jointly with the UN, monitored the procedure to ensure compliance (Trapp). 
 This framework designed by Russia and the United States required, “expedited 
transport and destruction of Syria’s chemical weapons far faster than any other declared 
stockpile to date” (Walker 9). The necessity for haste forced the CWC to change in order 
to accommodate the procedure. The United States provided the crucial watercraft 
equipped for disarming and destroying chemical weapons while Russia utilized its 
resources in Syria to move chemical weapons to these watercraft as well as deconstruct 
weapons facilities. The framework also diverged from chemical weapons seizures 
hitherto because it took place in a particularly hostile environments where, in some 
cases, inspectors came under fire (Walker 10). The chemical weapons destruction, 
which usually takes places relatively nearby the seizure site, had to be done outside of 
the conflict zone, thus transportation became a crucial elements of coordination that is 
not usually considered (9).  
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 As a result of this framework, the multilateral effort eliminated 98% of Syria’s 
declared 1308 metric tons (9). The faithful cooperation of all sides made an impression 
on the world about the potential effectiveness of bilateral cooperation between the 
United States and Russia over international conflicts. Indeed, the success of the 
framework contributed to the idea of creating the International Syrian Support Group in 
2015, a bilateral negotiation structure chaired by the US and Russia.  
 Critics of this cooperative effort site the fact that chlorine is an unregulated 
chemical under the CWC (Nikitin). Chemical weapons attacks inside Syria are still being 
reported after this framework already completed its work, many of them are using 
chlorine gas (SAMS, 2016). Subsequent reports have stirred closer observation of the 
situation in Syria, revealing “omissions and discrepancies” in Syria’s chemical weapons 
declaration to the CWC (Nikitin). A year after negotiations were underway on September 
21st, 2014, Secretary of State Kerry said that a recent OPCW report "raises serious 
questions about the Syrian regime's compliance with its obligations under the Chemical 
Weapons Convention (CWC) and UN Security Council Resolution 2118 as well as its 
willingness to continue using chemical weapons to kill or injure the people of Syria" 
(Kerry in Nikitin).  
 With such criticism, how can one be sure of the effectiveness of the bilateral 
framework in accomplishing its goals? In order to firmly understand this question, I must 
place the results of the bilateral framework within a context of absolute gains or losses. 
In the next section, I will define the explicit goals of the mission and pinpoint if and how 
its implementation fell short of expectations. I will also explore a counterfactual scenario, 
in which unilateral punitive airstrikes were carried out in place of bilateral cooperation in 
order to see how things could have gone had the framework not been implemented. As 
has already been made clear, the Syrian conflict is highly nuanced and has been 
constantly evolving since its outset. This makes it very difficult to find absolute clarity 
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with a counterfactual comparison because of the sheer number of factors one has to 
control for. Still, as my analysis will show, the counterfactual scenario helps us 
understand the options available to state actors and brings us closer to understanding 
the worth of cooperation in absolute terms.  
 
Goal Effectiveness 
 
 According to a statement issued by the Obama administration in September 
2013, the explicit goal of the bilateral framework is “the elimination of Syrian chemical 
weapons in a transparent, expeditious, and verifiable manner, which could end the threat 
these weapons pose not only to the Syrian people, but to the region and the world” 
(Obama, 2013). Claims of “omissions and discrepancies” in al-Assad's chemical 
weapons declaration along with the prolific use of unregulated chlorine gas as a weapon 
after the implementation of the framework point to obvious gaps in how effective the 
framework was in relation to its goals (Nikitin, Progress). The gas attack supposedly 
executed by the Syrian government in 2017 on the city of Khan Shaykhun, which used 
chemicals that are banned under the CWC and were supposedly removed from the 
country by the US and Russia, also points directly to the failure of the bilateral 
framework in ending the threat of chemical weapons in the region (BBC, 2017). If these 
weapons are still being used, then clearly the framework failed in relation to one of its 
primary goals.  
 However, the framework did successfully coordinate the confiscation and 
destruction of 98% of al-Assad's chemical stockpiles (Walker, 9). It did so quickly, 
efficiently, and transparently, by mobilizing the resources of major powers with differing 
agendas in the conflict. This means that the framework was indeed successful in regard 
to one of its major goals. The failures of the framework then stem from a lack of 
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compliance on the part of the regime, a factor multiplied by the chaos inside Syria. 
Whether al-Assad fully or partially relinquished his chemical stockpiles, it would be easy 
for him to hide illegal activity (either importing or concealing illegal chemicals) amidst a 
chaotic war where few international entities have real agency to monitor or control the 
situation inside the country. Therefore, the failure of the bilateral framework in meeting 
every aspect of its explicit goals is more attributable to the uniquely chaotic 
circumstances inside Syria than to faulty design and coordination by the US and Russia.  
  
Counterfactual Effectiveness 
The continued use of chemical weapons in Syria has brought the success of the 
bilateral framework into question. This analysis explores whether an alternative 
agreement structure (or no agreement structure) might have produced a different 
outcome.  
In order to understand the impact that unilateral punitive airstrikes might have on 
the Syrian conflict, I will discuss the airstrikes carried out in Libya in 2011, which led to 
the ousting of Muammar Gaddafi and caused severe protest from Russia, China, and 
others. The events in Libya bare special relevance to the political situation in Syria 
because they are one major explanation for Russia’s stubborn support of Syria’s 
government, that is, as a statement against international parties meddling in a nation’s 
domestic politics (Morris, 1270-1272).  
 In the case of Libya in 2011, western powers claimed the humanitarian 
imperative of coordinated air strikes against positions in Sirte and Tripoli. The results of 
these airstrikes forced Muamar Gaddafi to flee. The former leader was ultimately killed in 
subsequent events. Western powers who carried out these NATO airstrikes defended 
their decision by citing the threat of ‘genocide’ and the ‘responsibility to protect (R2P)’ 
(Campbell, 124). However, they have been strongly criticized by the global community, 
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especially Russia, for this interpretation of the R2P (125).  
 The international community called for an investigation into NATO’s actions in 
Libya, citing the likelihood that NATO committed war crimes by carrying out these 
actions (125). NATO was also blamed for destabilizing Libya and allowing a civil war to 
consume the country. The Guardian published in 2011 that, “[i]f the purpose of the 
NATO intervention in Libya was to ‘protect civilians’ and save lives, it has been a 
catastrophic failure” (126). The death toll in Libya, which according to UN sources was 
between 1000 and 2000 at the time of NATO’s airstrikes was up to ten times that 
number within eight months after Gaddafi’s death (126).  
 If similar airstrikes were carried out by NATO in Syria, one could expect an 
intense international backlash that could even amount to a counterstrike measure and 
conflict escalation. Russia’s stance against R2P in Syria, in favor of protecting the rights 
of sovereign leaders, can be understood as a direct reaction to NATO’s actions in Libya 
when “Chinese and Russian officials were so upset by the overstepping that they vowed 
to never approve such kinds of intervention again” (Cronogue, 145).  
By understanding what happened in Libya, one can see how unilateral action by 
a foreign power can be a very unpopular maneuver with severe ramifications for the 
prospects of diplomatic cooperation on the UNSC and elsewhere in the future. This is 
especially important considering the unanimous decision that a diplomatic solution is the 
only path to peace in Syria. Unilateral action from a foreign power as the potential to 
seriously escalate violence in a civil conflict. In the case of Syria, it can also increase 
mistrust between relevant parties, reducing the sharing of information and, thus, 
transparency surrounding the conflict. This outcome could severely damage prospects 
for a diplomatic peace which requires strong monitoring provisions and effective 
communication between parties to the conflict and their allies. 
 The world witnessed this counterfactual scenario in real time, after chemical 
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weapons were allegedly used in April of 2017 by the al-Assad regime on the city of Khan 
Shaykhun. The United States launched a unilateral punitive airstrike on the Shayrat 
Airfield, from which the chemical attack had been launched (Cronk, DoD News). The 
Syrian Government denied its role in the chemical attacks and Putin called the US 
strikes a “provocation” (RT, 2017). Although the retaliatory strike was not part of a 
greater US role in Syria, it did harm the diplomatic process by increasing mistrust. 
Relations between the US and Russia have reached a new low, leading the world to 
question whether they can successfully cooperate on anything (Miles, Reuters, 2017). 
This is important because the diplomatic peace plan outlined in the Geneva 
Communique requires cooperation between the US and Russia in order to be 
successfully carried out. If relations between these highly influential countries continue to 
sour, this will severely limit the ability of the UN to reach a diplomatic peace.  
 By comparing the counterfactual scenario of unilateral airstrikes with the bilateral 
framework, we can decide which strategy came closer to accomplishing the intended 
goal of eliminating Syria’s chemical weapons stockpiles and facilitating further 
international cooperation to reduce the violence in the conflict. Considering the 
unanimously accepted decision that a diplomatic solution is the only way to resolve the 
conflict in Syria, the success of the bilateral framework in nearly entirely destroying 
Syria’s declared chemical weapons stockpile is an obvious point in favor of the bilateral 
negotiation strategy. The events that transpired after both the NATO bombings in Libya 
and the 2017 punitive airstrikes by the US in Syria have confirmed that unilateral action 
on either side will increase mistrust and hurt prospects for productive dialogue.  
With this perspective, the effectiveness of bilateral negotiation on the chemical 
weapons framework in absolute terms is clearer. Its successes not only include effective 
coordination to seize and destroy al-Assad's chemical weapons stockpiles, but also the 
subsequent creation of the ISSG as a platform for cooperation. That is, cooperation not 
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only facilitated an effective response to accomplish a specific and complex task, it also 
exposed common threads between opposing agendas, allowing the chance for future 
constructive cooperation.  
 
The International Syrian Support Group Task Forces 
 
 The International Syrian Support Group (ISSG) is a multilateral negotiating body 
co-chaired by the United States and Russia. Its chief goal is to find a diplomatic end to 
the war in Syria. This body was conceived and created by joint efforts between the US, 
Russia, and the UN to utilize the respective leverage of each co-chair and their 
constituencies (RT, 2016). At its founding, the ISSG consisted of 19 member states but it 
has since grown to include 26 member states representing various agendas and 
perspectives in the conflict. The group was established after the ‘Vienna Talks,’ which 
took place in the fall of 2015. It aligns its goals with the 2012 Geneva Communique on 
Syria (The Syria Institute, 2016).  
 The apex of the ISSG is when the foreign ministers of member states meet. High 
ranking officials, including former US Secretary of State John Kerry and Russian Foreign 
Minister Sergei Lavrov, gather infrequently at the bequest of the UN Special Envoy or 
the co-chairs. The ISSG ministerial body has been convened in times of special need as 
a way to redistribute cooperative efforts or change strategy. For example, after the initial 
cease fire coordinated by the ISSG began to fall apart in April of 2016, the UN Special 
Envoy called for a ministerial meeting in order to strategize and relaunch the cessation 
of hostilities (The Syria Institute, 2016). 
According to the six-point plan formulated by the UN Joint Special Envoy to Syria 
and the Arab League, the priorities for reaching a diplomatic solution to the conflict are 
increasing humanitarian access into Syria and establishing a lasting cessation of 
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hostilities. These priorities are designed to create a healthy environment for peace talks 
and eventually became the basis for the formation of the ISSG Task Forces: the 
Humanitarian Access Task Force (HTF) and the Cessation of Hostilities Task Force 
(CTF). The task forces meet weekly at the UN headquarters in Geneva. Each is co-
chaired by representatives from the US and Russia and moderated by experts on behalf 
of the UN. The HTF and CTF began to meet in February of 2016 and continue to meet 
regularly today. These task forces are the subjects of this analysis. I will address each 
task force individually in order to deconstruct their respective successes and failures in 
absolute terms and then compare them to one another. 
 I analyze the ISSG task forces instead of the ministerial body because they meet 
more frequently and have more explicitly stated goals. The ISSG ministerial body has 
the broad goal of ending the Syrian conflict through diplomatic means, making it a less 
specific subject of study. The task forces, on the other hand, have specifically defined 
goals, which are seen as major benchmarks on the path to ending the conflict. The task 
forces and the ministerial meetings are highly interdependent. For example, a ministerial 
meeting might be called in order to relaunch a ceasefire that was negotiated by the CTF 
and failed to stick. Likewise, the ministerial agendas are dictated to the task forces, 
which negotiate in bilateral, trilateral, and multilateral meetings to achieve their goals 
(ISSG statement, 2016).  
 
II. Humanitarian Access Task Force 
 
The humanitarian crisis in Syria has existed since the start of the conflict in 2011 
and only grown worse. According to the UN, as of 2016, 85 percent of the Syrian 
population was living in poverty. There are currently 13.5 million people in need of 
humanitarian or security assistance. 6.3 million people are internally displaced, 
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homeless and adrift in their own war-torn country. There are approximately 4.9 million 
people living in besieged or hard-to-reach areas.  
These areas are of primary concern to humanitarian access negotiations on the 
ISSG (ISSG statement, 2016). The UN defines “besieged areas” as areas where no aid 
can enter and no civilians can leave. Hard-to-reach areas are slightly less severe, 
representing areas where denial of access is the chief reason for a lack of aid (UN HATF 
cable, 2017).   
There are two general categories of humanitarian aid that is coordinated by the 
UN in Syria: cross-border aid and local aid. Cross-border aid began after the UNSC 
passed resolution 2332 in 2014. This aid does not require permission from the Syrian 
Government because it enters the country at border crossings that are not controlled by 
them. Most of this aid goes to opposition controlled areas and does not require 
dangerous and questionable delivery methods. Both the UN and NGOs participate in 
cross-border aid. This aid represents a large percentage of the total aid entering Syria, 
but it cannot gain access to government controlled areas or besieged areas where there 
remain large populations of people in need (OCHA humanitarian response plan, 2016). 
 Local aid refers to aid that comes from within Syria itself, usually originating with 
the UN in Damascus. This form of aid does not cross an international border. It breaks 
down into two categories: the regular programs and cross-line aid. The regular programs 
originate in Syrian Government held territory, like Damascus, and go out to other places 
under Government control. This form of aid does not cross the front line of fighting and 
is, therefore, relatively safe and reliable. Cross-line aid, on the other hand, originates in 
Government controlled areas, mostly Damascus, and crosses the front line to go into 
contested territory. It is cross-line aid that targets besieged and hard-to-reach areas. The 
chief concern of the ISSG, among others, is facilitating and monitoring cross-line aid 
(OCHA, 2016).  
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Cross-line aid has been difficult and dangerous to implement. It requires 
permission from the Syrian Government on many levels and the guarantee of fighting 
groups that aid convoys will not be blocked. This guarantee has often proved to be 
unreliable. However, it is the only method available to the UN for gaining access to 
besieged and hard-to-reach areas, which the Syrian Government has proven unwilling to 
deliver to. As my research will show, this kind of access was virtually unattainable before 
the creation of the ISSG in 2016 (UNSC report 2016). 
 On February 12th, 2016 the ISSG ministers created the HTF in order to ensure 
that “all parties allow immediate and sustained humanitarian access to reach all people 
in need, throughout Syria, particularly in all besieged and hard-to-reach areas, as called 
for in UN Security Council Resolution 2254” (UN HATF cable, 2017). The word “access” 
is key for understanding the primary objectives of the HTF. By having allies of the Syrian 
Government, like Russia and Iran, in the weekly task force meetings, the UN can utilize 
their leverage with al-Assad to gain access for humanitarian aid to besieged and hard-to-
reach areas that would otherwise have been blocked by the Government. Likewise, the 
UN via the HTF can coordinate with the United States’ allies among opposition forces to 
ensure access for people in need. Figure 1 shows the locations of besieged and hard-to-
reach areas as of January 26, 2017. 
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(Figure 1 – UN/ReliefWeb;2017 - a map indicating hard-to-reach and besieged areas) 
 
Goal Effectiveness 
 
This analysis aims to pinpoint exactly how effective the HTF has been at 
accomplishing its explicit goal of gaining humanitarian access to besieged and hard-to-
reach areas inside Syria. Each month, the UN defines the specific number of people in 
need of aid deliveries in besieged or hard-to-reach areas in its request to the 
Government for approval of cross-line convoys. The HTF monitors implementation of the 
UN’s monthly plan, through the contacts and leverage of member states, for 
humanitarian aid deliveries to those places.  
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The goal for humanitarian access is to reach 100 percent of people in need for 
any given month. This is, however, rarely possible. When the UN decides on a number, 
it submits it to the Syrian Government as part of a complicated and ever changing 
approval process (UNSC report 2016). The Syrian Government responds with the aid 
deliveries they are willing to allow (often cutting off significant percentages from the 
original number) and the process for access and delivery continues. The Syrian 
Government has another opportunity later in the process to inspect the cargo of aid 
convoys and physically remove items that it does not want to be delivered. These recalls 
usually consist of badly needed surgical equipment (Hopkins, The Guardian, 2016).  
Figure 2 shows the total number of aid deliveries to both besieged and hard-to-
reach areas compared to the intended goal for each month starting from April 2016 (just 
over a month after the HTF began its work) to January 2017. This data includes only 
cross-line aid delivered to those areas which are reached by land via aid convoy. The 
data does not include airdrops or airlifts. Also, because aid convoys are not used to 
deliver aid to ISIL controlled areas, the data only shows the aid delivered to Syrian 
government controlled areas. It excludes airdrops and airlifts to cities like Dayr al-Zawr, 
which is controlled by ISIL.  
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Figure 2 (number of people targeted in blue, number of people reached in red. 
Numbers for besieged and hard-to-reach are totaled together) (UNHATF cable, 
2017) 
 
 Figures 2 shows a consistent failure to achieve the requested access. The only 
month indicating 100 percent of access granted is April. This near complete success in 
relation to the goal is misleading because it is due to a carryover in numbers from aid 
deliveries in March (UNHATF cable, 2017). Despite the unanimous agreement of the 
UNSC and the ISSG Ministers on the need for unhindered humanitarian access, there 
has not been a single month in which the Syrian government granted full access for the 
UN requested humanitarian aid. Furthermore, there is an observable drop-off in 
successful aid deliveries, indicating that humanitarian aid to besieged and hard-to-reach 
areas has dwindled significantly since November of 2016. 
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According to a UNSC report released in 2017, “Deliberate interference and 
restrictions by the parties to the conflict continued to prevent aid delivery.” Whether 
access is denied in the Syrian Government’s approval process or somewhere further 
down the line, the Syrian government represents the most significant roadblock for 
humanitarian missions in Syria. In addition to this, ISIL does not cooperate with the UN 
as a neutral bystander, which makes access to places like Dayr al-Zawr or Raqqah, 
which are besieged by ISIL, strictly limited to airdrops and airlifts. This method of aid 
delivery is far more costly and logistically complex than land convoys and is therefore 
less able to deliver significant, reliable humanitarian aid (WFP, web).  
The UNSC report mentioned above describes attempts to gain humanitarian 
access from the Syrian Government for the month of December, 2016. The initial 
request for that month was deliveries for 930,250 people in 21 areas including besieged 
areas. It laments that the Syrian government approved access for 798,200 of the original 
number, rejecting access to 14.2 percent of the beneficiaries or 132,050 people. In 
addition, the report cites:  
“As a result of delays in the issuance of facilitation letters, requirements for 
additional government and security approvals above and beyond the two steps agreed 
to with the Government in April, lack of adherence to agreed-upon protocols at 
checkpoints and insecurity, only one inter-agency convoy reached a total of 6,000 
people in Khan al-Shih, Rif Dimashq [in December, 2016]” 
That means that from the UN requested 930,250 people in 21 areas, only 6,000 
people in two areas were reached. In addition, from the single convoy that managed to 
reach its goal, the Syrian Government confiscated 23,207 medical treatments ranging 
from pneumonia treatment kits, surgical equipment, antiseptics, and inhalers among 
others. This is painful evidence of the limitations imposed on cross-line humanitarian aid 
by factors the HTF members were supposed to be able to influence.  
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Critics of the UN’s poor record winning access for besieged and hard-to-reach 
areas include 73 Syrian NGOs which backed out of the UN OCHA coordinated Whole of 
Syria humanitarian aid plan in September 2016 (SAMS, 2016). The NGOs signed a 
letter professing a mutual frustration with the UN OCHA humanitarian aid efforts, saying 
they were too complacent in response to Syrian government manipulations. The 
document criticizes the Syrian Government for non-compliance with humanitarian aid 
agreements and international law. It states that the UN is complicit in this manipulation 
by not pushing harder for Syrian compliance. 
The list of NGOs that signed this treaty includes organizations like the White 
Helmets (Syrian Civil Defense), and the Syrian American Medical Society (SAMS), both 
of which receive funding from the US Government. By backing out the of Whole of Syria 
information sharing program, the NGOs are refusing to coordinate with UN authorities 
until a more agreeable mechanism is created, which excludes all political influence from 
the humanitarian process. Although this critique does not directly target the ISSG HTF, 
the group may share some of the blame.  
To reiterate, humanitarian access is negotiated between the UN and the 
Government in Damascus and monitored in the ISSG HTF. Therefore, the bilateral 
US/Russia leadership has a significant politically charged agenda. Russia in particular 
has an interest in seeing al-Assad’s sovereignty, and therefore his politics, protected, 
even in the humanitarian process. It is mostly Russia’s leverage that the ISSG relies on 
to pressure the Government to provide access. However, it is naive to assume that 
because Russia supports al-Assad, it has the ability to control him.  
In fact, the historical relationship between Russia and Syria has been one of 
economic collaboration, development aid, and arms deals in an atmosphere of constant 
uncertainty. For example, when the USSR passed UNSC resolution 242 in 1967, calling 
for peace and universal recognition of Israel, it was unable to convince the Ba’athist 
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regime in Syria to tow the same line, despite substantial economic, military, and political 
support (Kreutz 16). On the same note, Moscow was unable to prevent Hafez al-Assad’s 
intervention against the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) in 1976 and 1983 or to 
improve Syria’s relations with Iraq (also a Soviet ally). 
 Syria and the USSR signed the “Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation” in 1980, 
recognizing their strong relations and the need for “military cooperation and consultation 
in case of threat to the peace and security of one of the parties” (16). However, despite 
this gesture, the USSR was forced to “respect the policy of non-alignment pursued by 
Syria” (16). In the later years of the USSR, relations with Damascus were defined by 
close military, economic, and political ties, while Moscow struggled to exercise full 
control over Damascus, not wanting to lose its chief regional ally and not having any 
effective means at its disposal to discipline the Syrians (16). Considering this historical 
trend of Russian-Syrian relations, it is unsurprising that Russia should have a hard time 
guaranteeing the compliance of the Bashar al-Assad government today, especially 
considering chaotic conditions inside Syria and al-Assad’s track record of poor 
compliance with international law. 
The ISSG HTF has been unsuccessful in relation to its goal of unfettered access 
for humanitarian aid. However, this failure stems from extremely unreliable compliance 
from major parties to the conflict: the Syrian government and ISIL. The following section 
will continue my analysis of HTF effectiveness by positing counterfactual scenarios. The 
objective of this method is to see what might be if the ISSG did not exist in order to 
better understand what impact the group has had, if any, on improved humanitarian 
access. 
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Counterfactual Effectiveness 
 
 The previous section illustrated to what extent UN efforts via the HTF for cross-
line aid to besieged and hard-to-reach areas have failed in relation to the goal of total 
unfettered access to people in need. In this section, I will analyze the potential impact of 
the HTF on improved access by positing counterfactual scenarios. The goal of this kind 
of analysis is to determine if even a marginal difference has been made compared to 
what could have been if there was no HTF or bilateral cooperation at all. 
The first counterfactual is one in which there is no ISSG or HTF to work between 
the UN and the parties of the conflict. If this relationship did not exist, the UN mission in 
Syria would be missing that platform which increases transparency and the capacity of 
the UN to engage leverage (via the US and Russia among others) on either side of the 
conflict to achieve its goals. This counterfactual actually describes the situation in Syria 
between 2011 and 2015, before the creation of the ISSG. The UN was heavily involved 
in cross-line and cross-border humanitarian aid but was handicapped by its lack of 
leverage with parties to the conflict (UNOCHA performance report, 15). This reduced its 
capacity to access besieged areas with much needed aid. Humanitarian efforts also 
suffered from a lack of information regarding the severity of the situation inside Syria. 
Monitoring provisions and information sharing platforms have been slow to develop, 
while the conflict itself has evolved rapidly (UNOCHA, 42).  
UN Secretary General reports from 2015 lament, “restriction on access and 
onerous administrative procedures that constrain the effective delivery of assistance” 
(S/2015/264). The reports cite meager numbers for access to besieged areas in each 
quarter of 2015. Between December of 2014 and February of 2015, for example, a 
report cites that less than one percent of people in need in besieged areas could be 
reached with food or medical aid (S/2015/206). Similar numbers were reported by 
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another report between June and August of the same year (S/2015/698). For some 
months in 2015, including February, no food deliveries of any kind reached people in 
besieged areas. A December of 2015 UN report cited, “[h]umanitarian access to people 
in besieged areas saw no improvement in 2015, with less than 1 per cent of people 
receiving food or non-food items per month” (S/2016/60). 
Figure 3 shows successful aid deliveries to besieged areas in 2016. The data 
includes convoys as well as airdrops and airlifts. It is clear from this graph that for a 
majority of the months in 2016, access to besieged areas was greatly improved from 
2015, even reaching nearly 40 percent of besieged populations in September and 
October. This difference in access to besieged areas suggests that coordination via the 
HTF did enhance the ability for cross-line convoys to reach communities in need. 
Unfortunately, the drop in successful access in December continued into 2017, 
suggesting a troubling return to the former access status quo (S/2017/339). For 
example, less than five percent of besieged populations were reached in March of 2017, 
which was actually the best month of the year so far.  
 
Figure 3 (UNSC report, 2016) 
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There are certainly many more factors beyond the presence of the HTF that are 
affecting whether humanitarian access is granted to besieged areas. Unfortunately, as 
has already been discussed, the control of access is in the hands of the Syrian 
Government more than any other party to the conflict. Their compliance with granting 
humanitarian access is historically shifty, regardless of US/Russian relations. Therefore, 
although this counterfactual scenario does indicate a marginal success for cooperation 
via the HTF, it does not represent any sort of definitive proof that said cooperation is 
powerful enough to overpower the agenda of the local regime. 
 Another possible counterfactual for gaining humanitarian aid access in Syria is 
one in which a unilateral mission is carried out by either the US or Russia. That means 
either of these powers acting alone to increase access and take some of the control 
away from the Syrian Government.  
 By having a physical military presence inside Syria and good relations with al-
Assad's government, Russia has the capacity and the access to push unilaterally for 
cross-line humanitarian aid to besieged and hard-to-reach places. However, success is 
highly unlikely based on al-Assad's actions. Russia’s unilateral aid efforts would only 
work within parameters set by the Syrian leader, as Russia strongly supports him and 
has historically acted only to maintain al-Assad’s legitimacy. Al-Assad has little concern 
for the humanitarian situation in areas not controlled by or friendly to the Syrian 
Government, as is proven by his Government’s unwillingness to allow full access for 
humanitarian aid. Therefore, one should likely expect little difference between the real 
life humanitarian quagmire and a Russian unilateral counterfactual. This situation would 
only reduce coordination with the US, whereby Russia would lose the advantage gained 
by having the US help facilitate aid deliveries with their allies in Syria.  
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 The Syrian Government would never grant the US permission to deliver aid 
unilaterally, so any unilateral action by the US could be seen as an invasion of a 
sovereign state. The same is true of other state actors with similar interests to the US. 
To avoid this problem, the UNSC passed resolution 2332, allowing cross-border aid 
without the need for obtaining permission from the Syrian Government. However, cross-
border aid does not allow access to besieged and hard-to-reach areas. Its impact is 
largely along the border territories which are under opposition or Kurdish control. 
Therefore, if the US wanted to act unilaterally to gain full humanitarian access to all 
areas in need, it would have to violate the sovereignty of the Syrian Government.  
Such an action could take two forms. The US could mount a full scale military 
intervention in Syria, thus gaining access to critical areas of need by force, or it could 
initiate a complex and costly mission of coordinated airdrops and airlifts, requiring 
significant military assets to defend the flights. Either action would require a military 
presence beyond what is currently in place, which could be costly, risky, and explosive. 
Although such an action could improve humanitarian access in the short term, it would 
run several grave risks. The US would inevitably provoke the Syrian Government to 
countermeasures for such a transgressions. Those countermeasures might even include 
Russian military forces, which would pit US and Russian forces against each other, the 
outcome of which is virtually inconceivable. At the same time, a unilateral mission would 
be a costly enterprise for the US alone that would put US citizens at risk with no 
guarantee that it would bring the conflict any closer to a resolution.  
After considering the counterfactuals, it is clear that cooperation via the HTF is 
marginally more likely to gain access to besieged areas. At the same time, this option is 
less risky and costly than any unilateral efforts to increase humanitarian access. Still, my 
analysis does not show consistent results for access because of the belligerent pursuit 
of a military victory by the Syrian Government and the growing presence of terrorist 
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groups. As the humanitarian situation exists today, cooperation for humanitarian access 
has been insufficient to counteract the forces of chaos and violence, which seem to grow 
stronger in Syria each year. It remains to be seen if the HTF can regain and maintain the 
momentum it had in 2016. 
 
Conclusions 
  
 What this analysis tells us is that, although ISSG HTF efforts to increase 
humanitarian access have been patchy, they are still the best hope for gaining 
consistent humanitarian access inside Syria without escalating tensions between foreign 
actors. Aid deliveries to besieged areas happen at a very low rate, but what access has 
been granted is thanks to coordination between the US, Russia and the UN to deliver 
their respective constituencies.  
The recent drop off in access is attributable to an ever more stubborn Syrian 
Government and the chaotic situation inside Syria. Despite the significant influence of 
the US and Russia, al-Assad has the final say on whether humanitarian efforts will be 
granted access. At the same time, the chaotic situation in Syria has gone beyond the 
means of any member of the conflict to control. The presence of countless armed groups 
with ever-shifting allegiances and fickle agendas has left powerful state actors helpless 
to react effectively without cooperation or a costly intervention. 
 To a certain extent, the recent drop off in humanitarian access is also a sign that 
Moscow has exhausted its diplomatic leverage with Damascus, despite continuing to 
provide military and political support to the Syrian Government (Bertrand, Business 
Insider). Russia appears unlikely to leverage its military support of al-Assad in order to 
coerce the regime into granting more access for humanitarian aid, suggesting that it is 
unwilling to compromise the strategic upper hand that the Syrian Government forces 
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have gained with Russia’s help. Other influences, such as the presence of Iranian 
backed ground troops, also in support of the Syrian Government, might also be diluting 
Russia’s leverage (Bertrand). 
The US and Russia continue to meet weekly on the ISSG HTF. Without their 
cooperation, the UN would have a reduced capacity for gaining and monitoring reliable 
cross-line access to besieged areas. The results of cooperation on the HTF show that 
the US and Russia are capable of working together, even when their fundamental goals 
for the end of the conflict disagree. Although progress is slow, the ISSG HTF is a 
glimpse of the potential for political cooperation to produce positive results in a difficult 
environment. 
 
III. Cessation of Hostilities Task Force  
 
A cessation of hostilities would be a fundamental first step towards ensuring a 
diplomatic solution to the Syrian conflict. Understanding how the US and Russia 
cooperate towards this goal via the ISSG Cessation of Hostilities Task Force (CTF) is an 
opportunity to truly test my hypothesis. The CTF is the ultimate test of cooperation for 
the US and Russia because the problem it aims to solve forces divergent agendas to 
compromise in a way that directly impacts the outcome. A successful ceasefire is 
supposed to support peace talks, which determine the outcome of the conflict (Geneva 
Communique 2012). If those talks fail, the ceasefire fails and violence returns. 
Therefore, a ceasefire is a highly political compromise. Considering how many parties 
are involved in the Syrian conflict, establishing a ceasefire is a very difficult proposition.  
According to former UN Special Envoy Kofi Annan’s six-point plan, the 2012 
Geneva Communique on Syria, and UNSC resolutions 2042 and 2043: “All parties must 
re-commit to a sustained cessation of armed violence in all its forms and implementation 
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of the six-point plan immediately and without waiting for the actions of others“ (Geneva 
Communique 2012). Despite an extensive history of diplomacy and humanitarian aid to 
Syria since 2012, a lasting cessation of hostilities has never been maintained. However, 
deeper analysis is necessary in order to determine if any substantive progress has been 
achieved by several ceasefire attempts and the negotiations that surrounded them. In 
order to analyze the effectiveness of the ISSG CTF in facilitating, maintaining, and 
monitoring a Syria ceasefire, it will be necessary to outline the order of major events as 
they occurred since 2016 with the initiation of the February 27th ceasefire. 
The ISSG CTF was created because of the strong need for an international body 
to monitor and maintain a ceasefire in Syria. The CTF remains intact today, meeting 
weekly in Geneva. It has the same structural components as the ISSG HTF: 26 
members co-chaired by the US and Russia and moderated by a special adviser to the 
UN Special Envoy. The task force has no operational arm inside Syria to do its bidding. 
It relies chiefly on the voluntary cooperation of armed groups as well as the leverage of 
its members to convince opposing sides of the conflict to stop fighting (ISSG statement, 
2016).  
The ceasefire of early 2016 was established with UN Security Council resolution 
2254. This resolution, “acknowledges the role of the ISSG as the central platform to 
facilitate the United Nations’ efforts to achieve a lasting political settlement in Syria” 
(UNSC 2254). The resolution also acknowledges “the close linkage between a ceasefire 
and a parallel political process, pursuant to the 2012 Geneva Communiqué” (UNSC 
2254). In the 2012 communique, a Syrian ceasefire is the first step of a plan meant to 
establish a transitional governing body within six months, a committee to draft a 
constitution, and, “free and fair elections, pursuant to the new constitution, to be held 
within 18 months and administered under supervision of the United Nations” (UNSC 
2254).  
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The cessation of hostilities was implemented according to plan in that it was 
monitored and facilitated by the ISSG. The US and Russia, utilizing their respective 
leverage over armed opposition groups and the Syrian armed forces, managed to get 
more than 100 armed opposition groups and the Syrian Government to agree to abide 
by the terms of the ceasefire (Al Jazeera 28 Feb 2016). However, due to a “marbling” of 
terrorist and non-terrorist fighters, the armed opposition as well as civilians were victims 
of collateral damage in attacks by Russia or the Syrian Government trying to engage 
terrorist groups.  
This has been a major point of contention in regards to the ceasefire. UNSC 
resolution 2254 contains a clause, which allows for the continuation of attacks against 
the terrorist groups ISIL and Jabhat al-Nusra during the ceasefire. The document notes: 
“the aforementioned ceasefire will not apply to offensive or defensive actions against 
these individuals, groups, undertakings and entities” (UNSC 2254). ISSG members are 
expected, under the provisions of this resolution, to coordinate information identifying 
such terrorist cells in order to operate cohesively to maintain the cessation of hostilities. 
However, despite further steps taken to strengthen US-Russian communication, this 
clause has been a major impediment to a lasting ceasefire.  
The cessation of hostilities negotiated by the ISSG in February went into effect 
on February 27th and did have an immediate effect on certain aspects of the conflict. 
Fighting died down in particular areas, allowing for an increase in cross-line and cross-
border humanitarian access (Micallef, Huffington Post). However, the provisions of 
resolution 2254 which allowed for continued fighting against terrorist groups including 
ISIL and Jabhat al-Nusra confused the cessation of hostilities by allowing fighting to 
continue unabated in many areas (Abboud, Al-Jazeera, 2016). Among the areas where 
fighting continued to rage was Aleppo, which the Syrian Government, with help from 
Russian air power, was attempting to take back from the opposition since 2012.  
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Aleppo was seen as a major strategic point of interest for both the opposition and 
the Syrian Government. It also contained significant populations of terrorist groups 
associated with ISIL or al-Qaeda, which occasionally enjoyed tactical short term 
cooperation with the opposition in fighting government forces. The terrorist presence 
created immediate tension once the ceasefire went into effect because the siege of 
Aleppo was allowed to continue under the guise that Russia and Syria were fighting 
terrorists. Russia and the Syrian Government continued to carry out strikes against 
opposition controlled areas, claiming that they were targeting terrorist groups. 
Meanwhile, the US and its allies criticized them for attacking elements of the opposition 
that had accepted the ceasefire (Micallef, Huffington Post). 
 The official statement from the ISSG ministerial talks in Vienna in May, 2016 
reflects their response to the notable failure of the February cessation of hostilities.  
Since the initiation of the ceasefire in February, Russia accused the US of allowing the 
flow of fighters, weapons, and financial support to continue into Aleppo, claiming that 
these resources were going to terrorist groups identified in UNSC resolution 2254. 
Meanwhile, the US accused Russia of indiscriminate bombing of opposition forces as 
well as civilians and medical facilities. The official ISSG statement notes “growing civilian 
casualties in recent weeks,” including attacks on hospitals, and re-asserts that this is 
completely unacceptable behavior for any member of the agreement. The statement 
also acknowledges the raging debate over who is violating the provisions of the 
ceasefire (ISSG statement, May 2016). 
The US and Russia released a joint statement on May 9th. It notes each side’s 
commitment to address the critical failures identified by the ISSG so that the ceasefire 
can occur in earnest. In the statement, both the US and Russia recognize “the progress 
that has been made with respect to the cessation of hostilities (CoH) in Syria, in 
accordance with our Joint Statement of February 22, 2016, and in improving 
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humanitarian access.” Both countries reaffirm their commitment to the cessation of 
hostilities and outline new terms for further cooperation. The US demands that both 
sides, “work with the Syrian authorities to minimize aviation operations over areas 
predominantly inhabited by civilians or parties to the cessation.” Russia requests “the 
United States’ commitment to intensifying its support and assistance to regional allies to 
help them prevent the flow of fighters, weapons, or financial support to terrorist 
organizations across their borders” (Joint Statement US-Russia, May 2016). 
 As these statements make clear, by May of 2016, the collapse of the cessation of 
hostilities was nearly complete. The results of the February 2016 ceasefire would largely 
be a greater awareness on the part of the negotiators about how to facilitate and 
negotiate an ultimate end to the conflict. Still, a significant opportunity was lost. 
Disjointed efforts to regain a meaningful cessation of hostilities continued through the 
summer of 2016 while Russian and Syrian Government bombings of Aleppo and other 
areas continued. 
The ceasefire was restarted in September of 2016, coinciding with the Muslim 
holiday Eid al-Adha (Al-Jazeera, Sept. 2016). Like the February ceasefire, it was 
monitored and facilitated by the US and Russia via the ISSG and followed the structure 
laid out in UNSC resolution 2254. That means that this ceasefire also allowed 
aggressive or defensive acts to continue against ISIL or Jabhat al-Nusra. Both the 
Syrian Government and the rebel forces signed onto the deal. However, al-Assad 
proclaimed in a public address after religious services on the holiday: "The Syrian state 
is determined to recover every area from the terrorists," and that the army would 
continue its work, "without hesitation, regardless of any internal or external 
circumstances” (Perry, Reuters, 2016).  At the same time, opposition forces criticized the 
ceasefire deal, stating that the logistics regarding attacks on terrorists groups would 
spark violence towards the opposition itself and contribute to the collapse of the 
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agreement (Al-Jazeera, Sept. 2016). The provisions of the ceasefire described how the 
US and Russia would coordinate militarily to target mutual enemies and reduce the 
confusion that plagued the February ceasefire (Al-Jazeera). 
The ceasefire was unpopular among the opposition from the beginning. Major 
opposition groups including the Free Syrian Army publicly criticized the plan shortly 
before it came into effect, calling it “unjust” and all but rejecting it (Al-Jazeera). By mid-
September, the ceasefire had collapsed, with Russia citing more than 55 instances of 
opposition aggression and 12 civilian deaths (and growing) since its beginning (BBC 
Sept. 2016). Then, on September 19th, a UN aid convoy was targeted by an aerial strike 
for the first time. At least 18 of the 31 trucks in the convoy were obliterated, with no 
obvious perpetrators named (Perry, Reuters, 2016). This tragic act was the final blow on 
the September ceasefire. Russia blamed the US for not putting enough pressure on its 
coalition to comply with the terms of the ceasefire. The US blamed Russia for 
indiscriminate bombing and not doing enough to ensure compliance from the Syrian 
Government. In short, little had changed for the better since February. 
In late 2016, Russia proposed a new regime of bilateral talks, this time only with 
Turkey and Iran, to be held in Astana, Kazakhstan. The Astana process was meant to 
rekindle the ceasefire. A ceasefire was successfully restarted by this group which hangs 
by a thread today (Alkhshali, CNN, 2017). These efforts were never meant to replace the 
Geneva peace process, rather to rekindle and sustain a ceasefire (Al-Jazeera, Feb. 
2017). It remains to be seen if these diplomatic vehicles are capable of jumpstarting a 
productive dialogue to end the conflict.  
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Goal Effectiveness 
 
 This narrative makes clear the lack of overall success enjoyed by the ISSG CTF 
in maintaining a lasting cessation of hostilities. This failure is due to a plethora of 
conditions pertaining to the situation inside Syria: the allegiances of armed groups, the 
classification of those groups as terrorist or non-terrorist, and the national interests of 
individual state actors including Russia and the US. Indeed, it is safe to say that 
Russia/US cooperation to advance a ceasefire has fallen short of expectations set by the 
UN.  
When comparing between the ISSG Task Forces, it is apparent that the HTF has 
been more effective in relation to its goal. There is simply less to show for ceasefire 
efforts than for efforts to gain humanitarian access. However, it is important to 
understand that humanitarian access and a cessation of hostilities are very different 
problems.  
 Establishing a lasting ceasefire, especially in a conflict with so many actors, is a 
very difficult task. Scholarship suggests that negotiated peace deals have a greater rate 
of failure than wars that end with military victory (DeRouen et al., 334). This tendency 
has to do with state actors’ capacity and willingness to implement a peace deal. There is 
a questionable history of the success of UNSC negotiated ceasefire deals and a lack of 
clarity about their legally binding nature, especially concerning non-state actors 
(Henderson, 372).  
 Considering the complex web of actors in the Syrian conflict, it is understandable 
that the Syrian Government, although it agreed to the terms of Kofi Annan’s six-point 
plan in 2012, suffers from a limited capacity or willingness to ensure a peace deal is 
followed. At the same time, its patchy compliance is evidence that it will place its own 
sovereignty above the wishes of the international community, even its own allies. 
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Russia, which possesses significant military leverage in Syria, has rarely utilized it to 
coerce al-Assad into compliance. It mostly relies on diplomatic leverage, which al-Assad 
only heeds as far as it suits his own interests. With these realities in mind, it is 
unsurprising that the process of establishing a ceasefire is slower going than the process 
to gain humanitarian access. 
The CTF has failed in relation to its goals of establishing a lasting ceasefire. In 
the following section, I will examine the first ceasefire effort in 2012 as a counterfactual 
scenario in order to determine what lessons were learned from that experience and see 
if they helped, harmed, or did not affect the effectiveness of subsequent ceasefires. We 
cannot say that the CTF has been successful in relation to its goal, but perhaps it 
represents progress on the path to a diplomatic peace.  
 
Counterfactual Effectiveness 
 
Efforts to establish a lasting ceasefire in Syria have been unsuccessful. However, 
this does not necessarily make US/Russian cooperation on the CTF frivolous. Despite 
the obvious failure of these efforts so far, it is reasonable to say that establishing a 
lasting ceasefire is a process and lessons have been learned with each attempt that 
inform later efforts for a more effective ceasefire. This section poses the ceasefire 
attempt of 2012 as a counterfactual and compares it to later attempts in 2016 in order to 
determine if there was observable improvement in its effectiveness due to lessons 
learned. 
UNSC resolution 2042 represented the first attempt to create a cessation of 
hostilities in Syria. It was passed together with Kofi Annan’s peace plan in April 2012. In 
order to monitor the progress of this initial ceasefire, the UNSC employed observers to 
monitor and report on the activities of the ceasefire (The Guardian, May 2012). These 
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observers were purposely positioned in hot-spots in order to be candid witnesses to 
ceasefire violations in locations where they were likely to occur.  
The ceasefire did reduce violence for a time on the ground. According to a UN 
report in July, 2012, “[t]he cessation of hostilities… seemed to have a dampening effect 
in the areas where observers were deployed” (S/2012/523). However, the first sporadic 
ceasefire violations began shortly thereafter and became more frequent with time. 
Observers proved valuable for reporting what was happening inside Syria, but were at 
significant risk in an ever worsening conflict environment (S/2012/523). An increasingly 
dangerous and environment created the need for an alternative method for collecting 
accurate and consistent information about what was going on inside Syria. Yet, for a 
time, the UN had to put up with a severely limited view (S/2012/523). This experience 
showed the importance of having reliable information sharing that does not place 
observers at risk. 
The failure of this ceasefire also confirmed the need for stronger pressure on 
either side of the conflict. Kofi Annan, in the announcement of his resignation from the 
post of UN Special Envoy to Syria in August, 2012, confirmed this observation when he 
stated that, “without serious, purposeful and united international pressure, including from 
the powers of the region, it is impossible for me, or anyone, to compel the Syrian 
government in the first place, and also the opposition, to take the steps necessary to 
begin a political process” (NY Times, Aug. 2012).  What Annan referred to is exactly 
what the ISSG and its Task Forces are designed to be: a platform for “purposeful and 
united international pressure, including from the powers of the region.”   
The ISSG CTF was established more than three years after the 2012 ceasefire. It 
addresses the failures of 2012 by providing a necessary instrument for monitoring and 
facilitation that has the capacity to constructively engage both sides of the conflict 
through representative member states. The ISSG CTF is also very flexible by design, 
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which allows it to adapt to the conditions of the conflict and diplomatic environment 
without having to start over with each ceasefire attempt. Another platform meant to play 
a similar role is the Astana process trilateral monitoring group. It was established in 
December of 2016 to monitor and facilitate the ceasefire negotiated in Astana by Russia, 
Iran, and Turkey. This trilateral group is similar to the CTF in structure because it is led 
by parties from either side of the conflict (Turkey on one side, Russia and Iran on the 
other) who can engage leverage with both the opposition and the Syrian Government.  
So has the presence of the CTF or the trilateral monitoring group improved 
chances for a lasting ceasefire? It is already clear from my analysis of goal effectiveness 
that neither group has been effective in relation to its goal. Still, there are subtle 
indications that having a group like the CTF increases the chances for a lasting 
ceasefire.  
The February 2016 ceasefire also had a dampening effect on conflict areas 
throughout Syria. Various sources reported, “the number of military activities and air 
strikes has decreased significantly” (S/2016/272). However, the UN was never able to 
ensure complete compliance from any party to the conflict.  UN reports from February 
and March of 2016 laud the increase in humanitarian access but can only cite ceasefire 
violations with no obvious sign that anything more than a temporary reduction in violence 
was taking place (S/2016/272).  
Despite there being no lasting reduction in violence, there was more significant 
agency on the part of international actors to re-coordinate their strategy and try again. In 
2012, the UN could only withdraw its observers and watch the situation in Syria worsen. 
In 2016, the ISSG co-chairs were in direct communication via the CTF. A joint statement 
issued by the US and Russia in May of 2016 shows their cooperative reaction to 
ceasefire violations:  
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“Recognizing challenges related to the COH in certain areas the co-chairs have 
re-emphasized the terms of the COH with field commanders on all sides, especially in 
Aleppo, Eastern Ghouta, and Latakia, where we are determined to improve and sustain 
the COH. We are using our influence with the COH parties on the ground to press them 
to abide by the COH, refrain from disproportionate responses to provocations and 
demonstrate restraint” (Joint Statement US-Russia, May 2016). 
Russia promised to “work with the Syrian authorities to minimize aviation 
operations over areas that are predominantly inhabited by civilians or parties to the 
cessation” (Joint Statement, 2016). Likewise, the US promised its commitment “to 
intensify its support and assistance to regional allies to help them prevent the flow of 
fighters, weapons, or financial support to terrorist organizations across their borders” 
(Joint Statement, 2016). These efforts proved unable to produce a lasting ceasefire in 
2016, but they did inform future ceasefire attempts. 
 In December, Russia, Turkey, and Iran agreed to relaunch a ceasefire as part of 
the Astana platform. The ceasefire, which went into effect on December 31, 2017, had a 
similar temporary dampening on the conflict with persistent fighting in many areas. 
However, these powers have agree to establish de-escalation zones in 2017, 
representing the first time that a ceasefire in Syria has had concrete geographic borders. 
A memorandum published by Russia, Turkey, and Iran describes the need for 
observation posts and checkpoints to “ensure compliance with the provisions of the 
ceasefire agreement” (Memorandum, May 2017).  At the same time, the new agreement 
will unite the military presence of its members in the continued fight against terrorist 
groups like the Nusra Front and ISIL (Memorandum).  
A lack of geographically defined borders has been cited as a major weakness of 
previous attempts (Al-Jazeera, Feb, 2016). As was previously described, there is little 
consensus between the US and Russia over how to engage terrorist groups under the 
42 
 
terms of a ceasefire, especially because they are intermixed with opposition forces. This 
is why some have argued for more strictly defined geographic zones where fighting is 
permissible. The de-escalation zones in the ceasefire plan drawn up in Astana are 
informed by previous failures to physically control where fighting is allowed to continue 
and where it is not.  
The US, although it is not a direct participant in negotiations or a party to the 
agreement, issued a statement in support of the plan, stating: “We appreciate the efforts 
of Turkey and the Russian Federation to pursue this agreement and have encouraged 
the Syrian opposition to participate actively in the discussion despite the difficult 
conditions on the ground” (Nauert, DoS, 2017). The success of this plan is yet to be 
seen, but its structure and information sharing mechanisms suggest that concrete 
lessons have been learned from past attempts that are informing new efforts to establish 
a ceasefire. 
One guarantee of future ceasefire plans is the inclusion of the CTF or a group 
like it in order to give parties to the conflict a platform for monitoring the ceasefire to 
increase transparency and compliance. Groups like the CTF provide a critical platform 
for meeting the monitoring needs of a ceasefire and engaging leverage on either side to 
increase compliance. If there is to be a diplomatic peace, it will require a ceasefire. If 
there is to be a ceasefire, it will need a platform like the CTF that can use leverage and 
increase transparency to bring parties to the conflict to accountability and compliance.  
 This counterfactual analysis does not definitively indicate increased effectiveness 
in subsequent ceasefire attempts. However, it does indicate that each ceasefire attempt 
is instructive to international negotiators and informs decision making which changes 
state behavior. Establishing a lasting ceasefire in an entrenched conflict where so many 
combatants refuse to stop fighting is not a problem that can be solved without trial and 
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error. Therefore, I argue that bilateral efforts to establish a ceasefire have not been 
entirely futile and hope remains for their success. 
 
Conclusions 
 
US/Russian cooperation via the ISSG CTF has failed to produce a lasting 
ceasefire in Syria. The primary contribution of their cooperation on this problem is 
informing subsequent efforts in order to advance the effectiveness of ceasefire efforts. 
Establishing a ceasefire is a process. It has evolved a great deal since the issuance of 
Kofi Annan’s plan in 2012. The ISSG CTF is a part of that evolution, but it is not the 
ultimate end. I argue that such a group is entirely necessary for establishing a lasting 
ceasefire because of its capacity for monitoring and engaging leverage on either side of 
the conflict.  
The US and Russia are still co-chairs of the CTF, which has taken a backseat to 
the trilateral body monitoring the Astana ceasefire. Their cooperation informed the peace 
process about the importance of information sharing between opposing sides. However, 
it did not improve ceasefire compliance or duration. Cooperation between Turkey, 
Russia, and Iran on the Astana platform has not proven any more effective at 
accomplishing ceasefire goals. This suggests that failure to implement a lasting 
ceasefire stems from the nature of the problem itself more than the ability of international 
actors to cooperate. Each ceasefire was honored with sporadic promises from the 
parties of the conflict to comply, which quickly fizzled back into violence. Al-Assad 
himself has openly criticized ceasefire efforts and clearly favors a military solution to the 
conflict (Miles, Reuters, 2017). Still, international actors of conflicting allegiances have 
displayed their commitment to establishing a ceasefire. Only time will tell if these efforts 
are futile. 
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In conclusion, I believe that this particular case study offers a great deal of 
perspective about the limitations of cooperation as well as its potential. On one hand, the 
US and Russia roundly failed more than once to implement a lasting ceasefire. On the 
other hand, as their joint statement of May 9th, 2016 shows, they displayed consistent 
commitment to a diplomatic peace by increasing their bilateral interactions via the ISSG. 
This kind of interaction is significantly more productive than no interaction because it 
provides a means for opposing agendas to be reconciled and meet common goals. Their 
cooperative engagement with Syria’s toughest problems is far from finished. Based on 
my analysis, I am confident that these nations will continue to adapt their cooperation on 
the road to a lasting peace in Syria. 
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CHAPTER III 
COMPARING BETWEEN THE CASE STUDIES 
 
 
 Goal effectiveness* Counterfactual 
effectiveness 
Findings 
Chemical Weapons 
bilateral framework 
Strong 
 
Continued chemical 
weapons use in Syria 
seriously reduces the 
relevance of these 
results. 
Best alternative for 
substantive results 
while maintaining 
healthy environment 
for cooperation. 
-When goals align 
cooperation is 
significantly more 
effective. 
-Unilateral action 
greatly harms 
diplomacy. 
ISSG HTF Moderate 
 
Poor compliance 
record aided by 
chaotic environment. 
 
Effectiveness 
percentage for 2017 
is much worse. 
-Avoids escalation 
from unilateral 
mission. 
 
 
-Bilateral cooperation 
(2016) gets more 
access than 
multilateral (2015). 
-Goals align=more 
effective. 
-Unilateral 
action=harmful/costly 
-Bilateral cooperation 
and information 
sharing can improve 
UN aid access. 
-Bilateral cooperation 
cannot guarantee 
compliance, but it is 
better than nothing 
ISSG CTF Weak 
 
-Poor compliance 
record aided by 
chaotic environment. 
-Conflicting rules of 
engagement under 
ceasefire reduces 
effectiveness. 
-Ceasefire closely 
linked to peace deal, 
highly political issue. 
A ceasefire will be 
more effective with:  
 
-Information sharing 
and monitoring 
 
-Geographic borders 
 
-influence with 
opposing sides 
-Ceasefire is a harder 
problem than 
humanitarian access. 
-Goals diverge=less 
effective cooperation.  
-Definitions 
diverge=less effective 
cooperation. 
-Having a 
cooperative platform 
is essential 
-Lack of success is 
due to problem 
structure as much as 
cooperative failures. 
 
Figure 4 
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 The case studies cover a selection of different problems in regard to the Syrian 
conflict. They represent different cooperative strategies and different outcomes. In this 
section, I will compare my findings from each case study in order to determine concrete 
factors which helped or harmed cooperation. The purpose of this comparison is to gain 
insights about what factors are likely to make Russian/US cooperation more effective 
and what factors have the opposite effect. Figure 4 highlights some of the findings that 
will be discussed in this section, in order to help the reader compare between each case 
study.  
 The effectiveness of the chemical weapons bilateral framework in relation to its 
goal was very high. The US and Russia, with help from other nations, did successfully 
remove and destroy nearly 100 percent of al-Assad’s reported chemical weapons, 
making this case study the most successful example from the three. However, as noted 
in Figure 4, the continued use of chemical weapons in Syria eclipses the success of this 
cooperative effort, suggesting that the Syrian Government did not comply with the rules 
of the CWC or pressure from its Russian allies. 
 Compared to the counterfactual scenarios of unilateral or multilateral action, 
however, it is clear that the bilateral framework was the best option for delivering results 
while also preserving a healthy environment for continued humanitarian cooperation in 
Syria. This perspective makes clear that unilateral action in a conflict with so many 
conflicting agendas, even for a humanitarian cause, is likely to escalate tension and will 
work against future cooperative efforts. Multilateral action, on the other hand, does not 
create enough pressure to ensure compliance from the parties to the conflict, who are 
desperate for self-preservation and incentivized to break international laws in order to 
stay alive. 
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 The fact that both the US and Russia, along with their allies, were in agreement 
about the goals of the bilateral framework is a major reason why operations were 
successful. By designing and implementing the framework, these countries aligned their 
agendas over this particular issue and were able to overcome problems that have 
plagued other cooperative efforts for peace in Syria. A major reason why the US and 
Russia were able to agree on the terms of the framework was that it did not directly 
impact the outcome of the conflict. That is, they did not have to reconcile their 
fundamental differences in agenda in order to successfully carry out their bilateral 
mission. At the same time, the normative significance for both the US and Russia in the 
eyes of world incentivized them to cooperate faithfully.  
 The ISSG HTF was much less effective than the chemical weapons framework in 
relation to its monthly goals for aid deliveries. However, it still enjoyed some success in 
gaining access to besieged and hard-to-reach areas that were virtually unreachable 
before. The difficulties experienced by this group in reaching their monthly goals are 
mostly attributable to a lack of compliance from the Syrian Government in allowing aid 
convoys full access to communities in need.  
There are many who blame the lack of humanitarian access on Russia for not 
exercising enough leverage with the Syrian Government to ensure compliance. Although 
this argument has merit, it over estimates the influence Russia has with the Syrian 
Government, especially considering the fact that many aid convoys are delayed, 
deterred, or ransacked at armed checkpoint with unreliable accountability to Damascus, 
let alone Moscow (UNSC report, 2017). The chaotic conflict situation inside Syria greatly 
contributes to the difficulties experienced by the HTF in guaranteeing access. 
Compared to counterfactual scenarios describing humanitarian access achieved 
unilaterally, via rampant airdrops or outright military intervention, or access achieved 
without the support of the ISSG HTF, it is clear that the Task Force does legitimately 
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improve access to besieged and hard-to-reach areas without compromising the potential 
for continued US/Russia cooperation. Although access is sporadic and largely 
dependent on the interests of the Syrian Government, it has improved to conflict hot 
spots where many people are still in need of regular aid. 
Airdrops coordinated via the HTF to the city of Dayr al-Zawr offer an interesting 
observation of cooperation for humanitarian access, which corroborates some of my 
findings. Dayr al-Zawr is besieged by ISIL, which is a mutual enemy of the US, Russia, 
and the Syrian Government. The goals of these conflicting parties are actually united 
against ISIL and this greatly increases humanitarian access because all parties are more 
likely to cooperate with each other. Although humanitarian access is less political than a 
ceasefire, it is still controversial as neither side wants aid to end up in the hands of its 
enemies. As most besieged areas are occupied by the opposition and besieged by 
Syrian Government forces, al-Assad is unwilling to allow full access. In the case of Dayr 
al-Zawr, the aid being delivered is going to civilians loyal to the Syrian Government, 
making al-Assad’s compliance in reaching them more reliable.  
As of August 22nd, 2016, the World Food Program (WFP) had successfully 
performed 100 air drops of much need supplies into the city of Dayr al-Zawr. Deliveries 
were momentarily halted in 2017 due to advances by ISIL but soon resumed and 
continue to keep the 110,000 residents of the city adequately supplied (WFP, online 
source). These operations benefit from cooperation between the US and Russia via the 
HTF by providing the WFP with the capacity to perform this highly specialized maneuver 
on a regular basis with a good success rate (UNSC resolution 2268). Considering the 
example of Dayr al-Zawr it is clear that the success of cooperative efforts is greatly 
improved by a cohesive and well defined agenda between cooperative partners. This 
suggests that even highly competitive powers like the US and Russia can cooperate 
effectively if they share common interests. 
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The ISSG CTF has been the least effective of my case studies in relation to its 
goal of facilitating, maintaining, and monitoring a lasting cessation of hostilities. The 
problems with this cooperative effort begin with the fact that a ceasefire is a very hard 
thing to establish through diplomatic means without an enforcement body. This problem 
is augmented in Syria because of the plethora of actors involved with diverging agendas. 
Compliance from various groups on both sides of the conflict has been extremely difficult 
to ensure for long. This problem is caused by unclear definitions between the opposing 
sides over how to engage ISIL and Jabhat al-Nusra. A ceasefire has also failed to stick 
because it is directly linked in the peace plan to holding peace talks and determining the 
outcome of the conflict. This nuance makes a ceasefire highly political and, thus, highly 
controversial and fragile. 
Compared to a counterfactual scenario in which the UN attempts to establish a 
ceasefire without a body to monitor for violations and engage leverage from either side 
of the conflict, the presence of the CTF becomes more understandable. The contribution 
made by this body towards a lasting ceasefire and successful peace process is small but 
promising. It is important to understand the peace process as, indeed, a process. At the 
present moment, it is far from complete, but by looking at ceasefire efforts from 2012 a 
progression in tactics is evident, which has produced positive results. For example, 
information sharing and monitoring on the CTF has proved more effective as a lasting 
tool than the UN observers deployed in 2012, which were placed in serious danger and 
produced a more limited perspective on what was happening.  
Considering the close link in the Geneva Communique of 2012 between a 
ceasefire and the peace process, it is only natural that there be a platform for 
maintaining a ceasefire that represents agendas on both sides of the conflict. Such a 
body is required if a diplomatic solution is to be found in Syria, because only this 
structure can utilize leverage from each side to bring the parties to the conflict to 
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negotiate. This means that, although greater unity regarding how the conflict is defined is 
essential for a successful peace process, it is, in fact, the opposing agendas represented 
on the CTF that make the body effective has an instrument for leverage.  
 Diverging agendas make cooperation harder, especially when dealing with a 
problem like a ceasefire that impacts the outcome of the conflict. Diverging definitions 
also reduce chances for successful cooperation. The trials of the CTF and the peace 
process in Syria illustrate just how important it is to find common ground when working 
towards a solution. However, information sharing and bargaining between opposing 
sides on the CTF is a fundamental part of allowing peace talks to occur. This analysis of 
US/Russian cooperation on the CTF illustrates an interesting paradox in which the basic 
polarity of the negotiators is necessary structure within the peace process. 
 
BILATERALISM VERSUS MULTILATERALISM 
 
 The distinction between bilateral and multilateral cooperation is important to 
understand when analyzing how the US and Russia have cooperated in Syria. According 
to Keohane, the nominal definition of multilateralism is, “the practice of co-ordinating 
national policies in groups of three or more states” (Keohane in Ruggie, 565). That is, 
the simplest explanation is that multilateralism entails cooperation between groups of 
three or more states where bilateralism includes only two states. However, John Gerard 
Ruggie insists that this definition does not address the qualitative characteristics of 
multilateralism. He concurs with William Diebold on the need to distinguish between a 
nominal definition of multilateralism and a qualitative dimension of the term, citing: “the 
issue is not the number of parties so much, Diebold suggests, as it is the kind of 
relations that are instituted among them” (Ruggie 566).  
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According to Ruggie, multilateralism organizes a group of three or more states 
“on the basis of ‘generalized principles of conduct’” (571). By “generalized principles of 
conduct,” Ruggie is referring to a set of rules akin to traffic laws, in which a certain action 
is stipulated for a given situation and this applies to all participating members in the 
institution (571). An example of this principle might be the obligation of states 
participating in a multilateral collective security agreement such as NATO to come to the 
aid of an ally no matter what their individual interests are in that scenario (571). 
 Bilateralism, according to Ruggie, offers a more tailored approach to treaty 
structure, which is more akin to a traditional alliance (571). This approach to negotiations 
allows for a case-by-case approach, which relies on flexibility to tailor needs to very 
specific problems. Thus, where a multilateral agreement is based on general obligations 
that apply across all member states, a bilateral agreement is based on obligations that 
apply to particular states to fit the needs of a particular problem.  
 This distinction is significant to diplomatic negotiations on Syria because the 
most impactful element of each of my case studies is bilateral, according to Ruggie’s 
definition. At the same time, these bilateral structures have replaced a multilateral 
structure that failed to produce results. For example, the Chemical Weapons 
Convention, a multilateral international agreement to eliminate the use of chemical 
weapons, has been soundly violated by al-Assad multiple times since 2011. This failure 
enraged the international community and galvanized the US and Russia to initiate a 
bilaterally organized seizure of Syria’s chemical weapons stockpile. The CWC relies on 
predetermined rules that apply equally to all treaty members. Syria was not a member of 
this treaty before 2013. When it became a member as a part of the weapons seizure 
process, the CWC itself was unable to carry out operations to confiscate and destroy al-
Assad’s chemical weapons. That is when the OPCW was created and the highly 
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specialized bilateral framework was implemented and executed to perform the 
necessary tasks. 
The Geneva Communique on Syria and UNSC resolutions 2042 and 2043 are 
multilateral, according to Ruggie’s definition, because they require all parties to the 
conflict to adhere equally to the same steps for de-escalation, regardless of their 
individual preferences: ““All parties must re-commit to a sustained cessation of armed 
violence in all its forms and implementation of the six-point plan immediately and without 
waiting for the actions of others” (G Communique 2012). This multilateral treaty has 
been a failure precisely because it could not take into account neither the polarizing 
agendas of various state actors nor the increasingly complex and chaotic conditions 
inside Syria. For example, debate over the structure and goals of the transitional 
governing body meant that the Geneva Communique could not simply be followed 
equally by all sides. Thus, the ISSG was created as a more specialized instrument with 
bilateral and trilateral components between the US and Russia (at times including other 
group members) in order to facilitate and monitor the peace process in Syria. 
The ISSG task forces are multilateral in structure with bilateral characteristics 
that make them more flexible. The 26 member body is united by the “generalized 
principles” stipulated in the six-point plan, the 2012 Geneva Communique, and UNSC 
resolution 2042 and 2043, among others. That is, the group is committed to a diplomatic 
solution to the Syrian conflict and agrees unanimously on the process to get there. 
However, the ISSG is co-chaired by the US and Russia, giving them leadership roles 
that go beyond the responsibilities of other members. The US and Russia assume a 
leadership position because of their significant leverage with their respective 
constituencies inside Syria. The US can bring the opposition to the bargaining table 
while Russia can bring the Syrian government. In this feature alone, the specificity of a 
bilateral structure is evident.  
53 
 
  A bilateral structure seems to be the preferred mechanism for meaningful 
cooperation between the US and Russia in Syria. A multilateral structure does not 
provide the flexibility these powers require to compromise, reconcile their differences, 
and act. Indeed, a common feature of all of the case studies is US/Russia leadership. 
There is strong evidence to suggest that equal footing, and even equal leadership roles 
are necessary features of any meaningful cooperation between the US and Russia. This 
necessity is caused by the unique history between these powers, including their Cold 
War legacy. It is also caused by individual characteristics of both the US and Russia 
regarding ideologies and how they perceive the mission itself. This nuance highlights, 
once again, the paradox of cooperation between these states. They are highly 
competitive and often have disagreeing positions. This can actually make them more 
effective as cooperative partners, because they possess complimentary leverage and a 
strong incentive to co-lead in order to ensure a fair balance of their opposing influences.  
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CHAPTER IV 
FINAL REMARKS 
 
 Time will tell how much the US and Russia can accomplish through cooperation. 
Although evidentiary and qualitative analysis yields uncertain results about the overall 
effectiveness of US/Russia cooperation in Syria, their perseverance and leadership in 
various cooperative efforts speak to their fertile capacity for cooperation when conditions 
are right. The case studies corroborate this observation and offer clues about what 
features of cooperation might be more conducive to the US and Russia working 
together.  
 Based on my observations, cooperative features that are more likely to increase 
US/Russia capacity for cooperation include: a bilateral agreement structure (preferably 
with US and Russian leadership), complimentary capacities in the problem, and strong 
monitoring provisions with high transparency. That is, if the US and Russia are 
cooperating bilaterally so that the capacity of their partnership is increased by their equal 
participation and the international community is witness to their joint efforts, then they 
will be more likely to continue cooperating. Where this gets tricky is when their 
complimentary capacities, represented in my research by the different but equally 
important leverage that the US and Russia have in Syria, stem from conflicting agendas. 
Conflicting agendas tend to reduce the effectiveness of negotiations. However, a 
paradox of bilateral cooperation is that conflicting agendas actually increase the 
importance of having a bilateral negotiating platform that can provide an environment for 
unifying those agendas. 
 The case studies also show in what way cooperation can be made more 
effective. They demonstrate that US/Russian cooperation today tends to be more 
successful when: goals are aligned and non-political, definitions are cohesive, and 
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transparency is high. That is, if they can agree on the details of what exactly they are 
trying to accomplish while also agreeing on how to define aspects of the conflict (i.e. 
parties to the conflict as terrorist or non-terrorist), then efforts will not be bogged down by 
conflicting national interests or divergent political agendas. In the case of humanitarian 
access, the conflicting national interests do not directly reduce access because the US 
and Russia are in agreement on the need for access to besieged and hard-to-reach 
areas as well as where those places are and how it should be done. In establishing a 
cessation of hostilities, on the other hand, there are fundamental differences between 
how each side confronts a terrorist group, which relate directly to the national interests of 
each party and are therefore highly politically charged issues. Cooperation is less likely 
to be effective in this case. 
 According to George Kennan, cooperation is possible when it serves the 
interests of the Soviet Union and their socialist ideals. He writes: “When there is 
something the Russians want from us, one or the other of these features of their policy, 
[anti-western, anti-capitalist], may be thrust temporarily into the background; and when 
this happens there will always be Americans who will leap forward with gleeful 
announcements that ‘the Russians have changed…’” (858). His observation has been 
echoed today regarding Putin’s Russia and its actions in relation to the West. Angela 
Stent, in discussing contemporary Russia, asserts that America plays a key role in 
Russia reaching its foreign policy goals (Limits, 264). Therefore, it is not surprising that 
their cooperation is both necessary and selective when it suits the national interests of 
each state. Stent admits that this dynamic, although antagonistic a times, can also 
manifest constructive partnerships (264).  
 Considering the case studies, I argue that the reasons for Russia/US cooperation 
over Syria today are highly nuanced and their success is dependent on numerous 
factors. I assert that it is an over simplification to assume a competitive relationship 
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precludes cooperation. National interests certainly have a significant influence on either 
side, but the lack of ideological contrast between each side, as well as the international 
representation of parties to the peace process, moves the reasoning beyond cryptic 
opportunism to a more internationally accountable and progressive cooperation. 
Therefore, although it is important to understand how the US and Russia are pushing 
their own national agendas in regards to Syria, this is not the only valence for 
understanding their cooperation. In this respect, it is incomplete and slightly pompous to 
assert that the motivations for US/Russian cooperation during the Cold War have been 
transplanted to the 21st century without taking into account the full complexity of today’s 
world, and specifically the Syrian conflict, in comparison with Kennan’s time. 
 Another somewhat tangential but altogether important observation that can be 
made regarding the case studies is how to improve US/Russia cooperative efforts 
towards a lasting ceasefire. Cooperative progress towards this goal was slowest of all 
the case studies by far, but my research did yield observations about how to improve it. 
In order to ensure greater compliance and a longer lasting ceasefire, the US and Russia, 
along with their cooperative partners, need to reach an agreement on who specifically to 
target as a terrorist group and where specifically to target them. They then need to act in 
unison as the ceasefire goes into effect with the relevant parties to the conflict to engage 
the enemy in that area alone. This plan calls for a highly synchronized military assault on 
terrorist forces in Syria which utilizes resources from both sides of the political field. 
By identifying a mutual target and working constructively together, the US and 
Russia could simultaneously reduce the prevalence of terrorist forces in the region while 
buying time for peace talks to reach meaningful progress. Ceasefire violations are less 
likely in this scenario because those groups that were most likely to commit violations in 
past ceasefire would be engaged in cooperative offensives against the ISIL or al-Qaeda 
presence in the country, distracting them from petty quarrels with other parties to the 
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ceasefire. The goal of this strategy would be to buy time for peace talks and begin a 
major international offensive (the first of its kind) against a mutual enemy of all parties to 
the conflict.  
Significantly more research needs to be done in order to account for the complex 
maneuvering required by this plan. Still, it comes from the simple observation of 
ceasefire attempts on the ISSG and US/Russian cooperation to improve them. This plan 
eliminates grey areas between cooperative partners by creating a more cohesive goal 
and strictly defined definitions and rules of engagement, which unite all parties to the 
conflict. The international nature of this intervention and a bilateral US/Russia leadership 
structure would utilize the inherent paradox of the peace process discussed above, by 
harnessing complimentary leverage and establishing a mutually defined goal. 
 If a diplomatic resolution to the conflict in Syria is to be found, the US and Russia 
will have a meaningful role in reaching it. If these inherently competitive powers are able 
to find modes of cooperation that work, it could create a brighter future for both 
cooperation and competition in the future. Although the common discourse of 
antagonism between these powers is not entirely wrong, it fails to account for the 
inherent dependency between cooperation and competition. If the US and Russia are to 
truly thrive in the international environment of the 21st century, they need to understand 
the nuances of that essential paradox.  
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